The Measurement of Trust & Satisfaction in Police and Gendarmerie based on International Instruments

Findings from a National Opinion Poll in Turkey
Improvement of Civilian Oversight of Internal Security Sector Project Phase II is funded by the European Union. The beneficiary of the project is the Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior. The project implementation is coordinated by the Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior, General Directorate of Provincial Administrations. Technical assistance for the implementation of the project is provided by the United Nations Development Programme.
Main Beneficiary
Ministry of Interior
General Directorate of Provincial Administrations

The Measurement of Trust & Satisfaction in Police and Gendarmerie based on International Instruments

Findings from a National Opinion Poll in Turkey

Prof. Dr. Sebastian Roché, Chief Technical Advisor
Research Professor at Sciences Po,
Institute of Political Science, University of Grenoble, France

Short Term Experts who Authored the Report
Dr. Mai Sato, Centre for Criminology, University of Oxford
Prof. Dr. Mike Hough, Institute for Criminal Policy Research,
Birkbeck, University of London

We would like to thank to the Ministry of Interior personnel for their support on preparation of this booklet

March 2015

Improvement of Civilian Oversight of Internal Security Sector Project Phase II
Improvement of Civilian Oversight of Internal Security Sector Project Phase II is funded by the European Union. The beneficiary of the project is the Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior. The project implementation is coordinated by the Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior, General Directorate of Provin- cial Administrations. Technical assistance for the implementation of the project is provided by the United Nations Development Programme.

The targets of the civilian oversight project are threefold:

- the protection of human rights and freedoms and enjoyment of democratic rights constitutes,

- the establishment of a legal and institutional system (governmental, managed by the Ministry of Interior) with the capacity of excercizing civilian oversight,

- promote an ISFs' system centered on users' needs as well as more transparent to civil society (citizen focused and not state focused).

The Improvement of Civilian Oversight of Internal Security Sector Project activities aim at:

- clarifying the concept of civilian oversight and disseminating it to the civil administrators and internal security forces chiefs,

- establishing a legal framework for effective civilian oversight after carrying out comparative studies including Turkey, Spain, UK, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Germany and France,

- increasing the capacity of the Ministry of Interior to oversee all internal security forces.
The Measurement of Trust & Satisfaction in Police and Gendarmerie based on International Instruments

Findings from a National Opinion Poll in Turkey

UNDP Book Series on “Civilian Oversight of Internal Security Forces in Turkey”

Dr. Mai Sato, Centre for Criminology, University of Oxford
Prof. Dr. Mike Hough, Institute for Criminal Policy Research, Birkbeck, University of London

Book Series Editor Prof. Dr. Sebastian Roché

Ankara, March 2015
Ertem Printing
Table of Contents

Summary 6

1. Introduction 8
   Project Aims and ISFs 8
   Public Surveys as a Tool for Civilian Oversight 8
   Existing International Efforts 9
   Police and the Gendarmerie in Turkey 9

2. Methodology 10

3. Contact and Satisfaction with ISFs 12
   Contact with ISFs 12
   Types of Contact 15
   Satisfaction with ISFs 17

4. Trust in ISFs 19
   Comparison between Police and Gendarmerie 19
   Fair and Equal Treatment by ISFs 21
   Trust in Effectiveness of ISFs 22
   Exploring links between Satisfaction and Trust 23

5. Legitimacy of the ISFs 24
   Legitimacy of ISFs 24

6. Turkey in International Context 27
   Overall Trust 27
   Country Groups 28
   Trust in Effectiveness 29
   Trust in Procedural Fairness 30
   Legitimacy 31
   Obligation to Obey 32
   Moral Alignment 32

7. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 34

Appendix 1 – Technical Report 36
Appendix 2 – Questionnaire 42
# Table of Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2.1</td>
<td>Sample Selection: Provinces</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3.1</td>
<td>Contact With ISFs by Age and Gender</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3.2</td>
<td>Contact With ISFs by Province</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3.3</td>
<td>Reasons for ISF-initiated Contact</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3.4</td>
<td>Reasons for Citizen-initiated Contact</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3.5</td>
<td>Satisfaction with Contact</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.1</td>
<td>Trust in The Police and The Gendarmerie</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.2</td>
<td>Trust in Equality of Treatment</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.3</td>
<td>Trust in Fair and Respectful Treatment</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.4</td>
<td>Trust in Effectiveness</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5.1</td>
<td>Felt Obligation to Obey</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5.2</td>
<td>Explaining Felt Duty to Obey the ISFs</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.1</td>
<td>Overall Trust in Isfs: International Comparison</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.2</td>
<td>Trust in ISF Effectiveness: International Comparison</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.3</td>
<td>Trust in ISF Fairness: International Comparison</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.4</td>
<td>Obligation to Obey ISF: International Comparison</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.5</td>
<td>Moral Alignment with ISF: International Comparison</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Measurement of Trust & Satisfaction in Police and Gendarmerie based on International Instruments

Findings from a National Opinion Poll in Turkey

Report on National Survey:
Citizen Satisfaction and Trust in ISFs

SUMMARY

This report presents the results of a national survey of trust in the Turkish Internal Security Forces (ISFs). The survey forms part of a larger Ministry of the Interior project, "Improvement of Civilian Oversight of the Internal Security Sector" funded by the European Union and carried out by the Ministry of Interior with technical assistance of UNDP. The overall aim of the project is to develop and extend public accountability of the ISFs, as accountability of this sort is seen to promote public consent to the rule of law and improve the effectiveness of the ISFs.

The national survey replicated key parts of a module of the 2010 European Social Survey carried out in 27 countries, and the Crime Survey for England and Wales. The survey asked a large representative sample of the Turkish public about their experience of, and attitudes, towards the ISFs. The survey describes the extent of public contact with the police; it identifies the factors that can build trust in the police and the Gendarmerie; it can compare ratings of the police and the Gendarmerie, and it can show how the Turkish ISFs compare to those in other countries in terms of public trust.

Contact with ISFs

- 15% of the sample had some contact with ISFs in the last two years. Men were more likely to have contact than women, and those aged 25 to 34 more likely than other age groups.
- Six out of ten contacts were ISF-initiated. These fell into three main categories: suspicion-based (47% of ISF-initiated contacts); enforcement (29%); and advice (17%).
- The two largest categories of citizen-initiated contact were reporting crimes or traffic accidents (54%) and asking for help or advice (26%).

Satisfaction with ISF Contacts

- 40% of those with police contact were satisfied, compared to 61% of those with Gendarmerie contact.
- 21% of those with police contact were dissatisfied, and 6% of those with Gendarmerie contact.
- Refusal rates for this question were high, and dissatisfaction rates may thus be understated.
- Respondents were (unsurprisingly) less satisfied with the police when their contact was police-initiated rather than citizen-initiated. By contrast, Gendarmerie-initiated contacts did not seem to result in dissatisfaction.
- Respondents under the age of 25, and those living in cities tended to be less satisfied than others.
Trust in ISFs

- 52% of respondents thought that their ISF was doing a good job.
- 47% of those living in police areas thought their ISF did a good job, compared with 74% in Gendarmerie areas.
- 67% of respondents in Gendarmerie areas thought their ISF provided equal treatment for all, compared to 47% of those in police areas.
- Similarly, the Gendarmerie scored higher on ratings of fairness and respect.
- Respondents rated the Gendarmerie higher on items measuring trust in effectiveness.
- Satisfaction with police contact is a strong predictor of both trust in effectiveness and trust in fairness.

Implications

Interpreting these findings requires sensitivity to Turkish culture and traditions, which the authors of this report cannot claim. However, the basic relationships that the survey has uncovered between trust and legitimacy are in line with research in other countries. Given this, it seems likely that in Turkey, no less than other countries, the surest route for building or consolidating ISF legitimacy is to improve public trust in the police and Gendarmerie. And if other countries are a reliable guide, improving people's experience of contact with the police is likely to be an important way of improving trust.

Perceived Legitimacy of ISFs

- On a scale measuring respondents' sense of 'obligation to obey' their ISF, the police scored slightly lower than the Gendarmerie.
- In a statistical model designed to identify what factors predicted perceptions of ISF legitimacy, trust in ISF effectiveness emerged as the strongest predictors of respondents' sense of obligation to obey their ISF (a core element of legitimacy).
- Trust in ISF fairness emerged as the next strongest predictor.

Comparisons with Other Countries

- As measured by a general question asking how good a job the ISFs do, Turkey falls in the middle third of European countries where comparison is possible.
- The Turkish public has higher than average trust in the effectiveness of their ISFs, but lower than average trust in ISF fairness.
- Turkish ISFs are rated quite highly by the public, relative to other countries, on a measure of legitimacy that reflects a sense of 'obligation to obey' ISFs.
- However, they score relatively poorly on a measure of legitimacy that reflects 'moral alignment' between ISFs and the public.
1. Introduction

Project Aims and ISFs

This report presents the results of a national survey of trust in the Turkish Internal Security Forces (ISFs). The survey forms part of a larger Ministry of the Interior (MoI) project, “Improvement of Civilian Oversight of the Internal Security Sector” funded by the European Union and carried out by the Ministry of Interior with technical assistance of UNDP. The MoI initiated the first phase of the project in 2008, and the second phase in 2012.

The project aims to expand the democratic control of the Turkish Internal Security Forces (ISFs) and to further increase the enjoyment of civil rights by Turkish citizens. It does so by establishing institutional and regulatory frameworks to provide effective oversight of ISFs at central and local levels. The project is designed to support MoI plans to transform the management of ISFs by introducing a more open and transparent system of governance - in partnership with civil society - that approaches security and public safety from a human-centred perspective.

The Project tackles three areas of reform: legislative (component A), capacity building (component B) and civil society and media (component C). This Report comes under 'capacity building' which provides the MoI and public administrators with the tools to strengthen civilian oversight of the ISFs and to meet EU standards for human rights protection.

Why is it important to strengthen civilian oversight? ISFs, unlike other public officials, have special powers such as the use of force, carrying out arrests and ID checks, and tracking private communications, all of which can directly affect individual rights and freedom. While these powers – often coercive – may be necessary in the interest of public security, it is crucial that they are not abused or used arbitrarily. It is in this sense that civilians oversight of ISFs becomes crucial in securing and monitoring the protection of human rights as well as enhancing democracy.

Public Surveys as a Tool for Civilian Oversight

Turkish ISFs, as in other countries, evaluate their performance by reference to measures derived from arrest statistics, recorded crime rates, and patrol visibility, for example. These are useful indicators to monitor and track police activities over time, but it equally important to include measures of performance that reflect Turkish citizens’ evaluation of their ISFs. Surveys can gather information about citizens’ experience of ISFs, their level of trust in ISFs, and most importantly whether they think ISFs are a legitimate public body that can be entrusted with powers – which sometimes restricts individual freedom – to protect its citizens.

Surveys functions as a means of citizen feedback to the ISFs, which they in turn can use to formulate policy. Surveys offer three main advantages:

- **Trust as new performance indicator:** Conducting a survey which measures levels of satisfaction and trust means the ISFs do not only have to rely solely on traditional performance

---

indicators such as the number of arrests. The new indicator will help build a security force based on cooperation and respect from the public.

- **Long-term commitment**: Surveys can provide the MOI with empirical data to support implementation and monitoring of new policies. When repeated over time, surveys can enable the MOI to track the impact of any changes made.

- **Citizen participation**: Being interviewed for a survey is a display of commitment that citizens views matter. Regardless of the result of the survey (and even if the results are unfavourable to the ISFs), the idea of being ‘heard’ can be just as important as the outcome of the survey.

## Existing International Efforts

 Efforts to measure satisfaction with, and trust in, the security forces through surveys exist both at the national and international level. In the United Kingdom, for example, *The Crime Survey for England and Wales* (formerly known as *the British Crime Survey*) has asked interviewees to evaluate the police since 1982.⁴ Supra-national efforts to measure trust in the security forces in a comparative context can be found in the *European Social Survey*.⁵ Round 5 of the European Social Survey conducted in late 2010 included a module on trust in justice, which was carried out in 27 countries across Europe. Since then it has been replicated in whole or in part in the United States, Japan, Albania, South Africa and several Latin American countries.

 The questionnaire used for the Turkish national survey for this Project borrows heavily from questions used in the Crime Survey for England and Wales and in Round 5 of the European Social Survey. The Turkish survey covers trust in, and satisfaction with, ISFs; it asks first about contact with the police and the Gendarmerie, and then asks more general questions relating to trust in ISFs. This report presents the main findings, comparing the police and the Gendarmerie, and showing how these findings compare with those from other countries.

## Police and the Gendarmerie in Turkey

 The two main types of ISFs are the police, and the Gendarmerie⁶, with the latter being a military force made up mainly of citizens who are serving their mandatory military service.⁷ Both forces come under the MOI. The main difference between the police and the Gendarmerie is in the areas that they serve. As a general rule, the police operate in urban areas, and the Gendarmerie serve the rural areas of Turkey. However, the Gendarmerie have responsibility for some parts of some cities, and responsibilities are sometimes shared even within the smallest neighbourhoods unit (‘mahallei’). As of December 2014, there were 46 neighbourhoods served by both ISFs for our sample.

---

⁴ Crime Survey England for England and Wales: [http://www.crimesurvey.co.uk](http://www.crimesurvey.co.uk)

⁵ European Social Survey: [http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org](http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org)

⁶ In addition, there are also the Zabita – the equivalent of neighbourhood wardens and traffic wardens in European cities enforcing local municipal regulations – but the national survey focused only on the police and Gendarmerie as the main ISFs.

⁷ Karasus et al., p.309
With the population of Turkey at around 81 million (as of July 2014), 91% of the population live in urban areas,\(^8\) and the majority of these fall within the jurisdiction of the police. Reflecting this, there are many more serving police officers than Gendarmes. This trend is a continuing one, as the country becomes more urban. Legislation that came into force in April 2014 – Büyükşehir Yasası - redesigned various previously rural areas as metropolitan municipalities.

While the number of Turkish people living in police areas is significantly larger than those living in Gendarmerie areas, in terms of the size of the geographical area that each ISFs patrol, the reverse is true. Using the number of neighbourhoods as a measure of areas covered by ISFs, the Gendarmerie covers majority of those neighbourhoods. In rural areas, therefore, Gendarmerie are patrolling a small number of citizens living in a vast area of land, whereas in urban areas, the police cover large populations living in small areas. The survey findings need to be interpreted with these differences in mind.

2. Methodology

The national survey had a large representative sample of the adult Turkish population. Ipsos Turkey was contracted to carry out the fieldwork between December 2014 and January 2015. A quota sample was assembled of 3,619 respondents across Turkey. Respondents aged 18 and above were surveyed in 359 neighbourhoods, drawn from 28 provinces (see Figure 2.1). The sample is representative of the Turkish public in terms of demographics – age, gender and education – which relied on the results from the 2013 Address Based Population Registration System of TURKSTAT.

In terms of police and Gendarmerie distribution, 80% of the respondents in the sample did so. It was estimated that this distribution is a proportional representation, according to the information received by governors in sampling areas. No official information was available from the MoI.

Interviews were carried out face-to-face in the home, using computer-assisted personal interviewing (CAPI). Anonymity was offered as an option in completing the survey. The Project team was informed by Ipsos Turkey that it is common practice for market research companies to collect respondents’ personal data such as name and contact details. For the purpose of this survey, a compromise was reached where Ipsos Turkey collected personal data only when respondents were happy to do so; 68% of respondents offered their personal details at the end of the survey. While this method offered anonymity to those who chose to exercise it, we note that social desirability bias may be present in our data.

In order to assess the quality of the data, interviewers were instructed after each interview to record the respondent’s level of comprehension of questions, and their willingness and sincerity in answering questions. Over half (52%) of the respondents ‘never’ or ‘almost never’ sought clarifications of questions. The majority of respondents (67%) were ‘never’ or ‘almost never’ reluctant to answer questions. Interviewers also felt that over half (55%) of respondents ‘very often’ or ‘often’ tried to answer questions to the best of their ability.

While there is little variance in age group and gender in how respondents answered the above three questions, there are large geographical differences. Both Istanbul residents and those living in very rural areas were judged as more reluctant to answer questions than other interviewees. For example, interviewers in Istanbul rated 51% of their respondents as ‘never’ or ‘almost never’ reluctant to answer questions – 16 percentage points below the national average of 67%. The equivalent figures for areas in rural eastern Turkey such as Mardin and Van were 22% and 32%.

The questionnaire had three sections. The first section dealt with respondents’ actual experience with the ISFs: whether or not respondents had any contact with the police or Gendarmerie in the last two years; and if so, the number of contacts, and their level of satisfaction with the contact. The second section dealt with perceived trust in the ISFs (hence separate from actual contact): to what extent did respondents perceive the police or Gendarmerie to be effective, respectful, and fair. The third section collected information on demographics, which included sex, age, income, and education. The questionnaire did not include questions on religion, political affiliation, or ethnicity.

9 Since 99% of the Turkish population is Muslim according to the CIA Worldfact Book 2014, it was decided not to include a question on religion.
Figure 2.1: Sample Selection: Provinces

3. Contact and Satisfaction with ISFs

Contact with ISFs

This chapter focuses on ISF and citizen contact. This may be a contact initiated by a citizen such as the reporting of a crime, or it could be initiated by an ISF officer, for example in conducting a stop and search. Some individuals will have had more contact with the ISFs than others, and some may have been satisfied or dissatisfied with the way officers treated them. Respondents were asked about satisfaction only where they had actual contact with the ISF.

Respondents were asked if they have had any contacts with ISFs in the last two years. ‘Contact’ here includes both ISF-initiated and citizen-initiated contacts. 15% of respondents stated that they had. When comparing gender, men (20%) have twice as much contact with the ISFs than women (10%). In terms of age, the highest rate of contact was seen in those aged between 25 and 34 (31%) and contact rates fell as respondents got older.

Figure 3.1: Contact with ISFs by Age and Gender

Overall Contact

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15%

Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20% 10%
The level of contact with ISFs varied by province. Figure 3.2 illustrates the level of contact using the national average (15%) as a reference point. The nine red and yellow provinces indicate higher level of contact and the light and dark blues indicate contacts lower than the national average. The highest levels of contact were seen in provinces such as Ağrı (32%), Erzurum (27%) and Van (24%), whereas lowest levels were seen in Istanbul (6%), Mardin (7%). There seems to be no link between provinces with higher levels of refugees – such as Hatay, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Adana, Mardin, and Malatya – and contact with the ISFs.

**Figure 3.2: Contact with ISFs by Province**

- **Red**: Contact above 20%
- **Yellow**: Contact between 15 – 20%
- **Light Blue**: Contact between 10 – 15%
- **Dark Blue**: Contact below 10%
- **Grey**: Provinces not part of the survey
Types of Contact

For respondents who reported contact with the ISFs, the survey proceeded to ask whether the contact was ISF-led or initiated by them. The results showed that more contacts were initiated by the ISFs (59%) and this proportion was roughly similar when sub-divided into police-led contacts (60%) and Gendarmerie-led contacts (56%).

The survey also examined the reasons for these contacts (see Figure 3.3)\textsuperscript{10}. For ISF-initiated contacts, reasons were grouped into three categories: suspicion, enforcement and advice. Having your ID checked, being asked to conduct a breath test, being searched, being questioned all came under the ‘suspicion’ category. This model of suspicion-based contact was the most common, which constituted 47% of overall ISF-initiated contact. ‘Enforcement’ such as being arrested, given a warning, being fined, and summoned – policing through sanctions – came second, constituting 29% of ISF-initiated activity. This was followed by ‘advice’ (17%) where ISFs simply gave citizens advice about driving or attempted to stop fights and arguments, without enforcing their more coercive police powers such as issuing a fine or giving a formal warning.

When ISF-initiated contacts were analysed by ISF type (Police or Gendarmerie), there were similar patterns of ISF-initiated activities. Contacts based on suspicion were the most common followed by enforcement. The Gendarmerie had a slightly higher proportion of suspicion-based contacts than the police and a smaller proportion of their contacts involved giving advice – but in each case there was a difference of only five percentage points.

Citizen-initiated contact was divided mainly into two categories: reporting an incident such as a crime or traffic accidents (54%) and asking for ISF help (26%). In addition to these two types of contact, ‘filing a complaint against the ISF officers’ was also offered as an option but comprised only a tiny proportion (1%). ‘Other’ types of citizen-initiated contact included for example, obtaining administrative documents at an ISF station (19%).

\textit{Figure 3.3: Reasons for ISF-initiated Contact}

\textsuperscript{10}The survey asked about the respondent’s most recent contact.
**Asking for help** – the second most common type of contact – included those who sought advice on crime-related matters such as drug dealing on the streets, domestic violence, suspicious strangers in the neighbourhood; and non-crime-related matters such as noisy neighbours or parking problems (Figure 3.4). ’Asking for help’, which encompassed a wide-range of non-crime and crime-specific issues comprised only a quarter of citizen-initiated contact, as opposed to reporting crimes or accidents, which comprised half of citizen-initiated contacts. This suggests that Turkish citizens view the ISFs more as bodies that provide a reactive service to problems and less as one that anticipates or prevents problems.

Looking at whether or not patterns of citizen-initiated contacts differed between the police and the Gendarmerie, the survey showed more variety in comparison to ISF-initiated contact, but the difference is a matter only of degree. Reporting of a crime or an accident remains the majority reason for citizen-initiated contact. Citizens living in a Gendarmerie protected area, however, use their security force more to report crimes and accidents (Gendarmerie: 61% vs police: 53%) and less to seek help (Gendarmerie: 18% vs police: 28%).

The above finding is consistent with ISF -and citizen-initiated contacts both providing and expecting reactive service: on the one hand, ISFs initiate contact with the public mainly because their suspicion has been aroused, or because there is a need for enforcement action. And on the other hand, citizens largely contact the ISFs to report crimes and accidents. The survey did not find much evidence of public approaches to the police, or approaches initiated by the police, that related to community and neighbourhood issues in the tradition of community policing.

*Figure 3.4: Reasons for Citizen-initiated Contact*
Satisfaction with ISFs

This section deals with the qualitative assessment of contact with the ISFs. Respondents were asked how satisfied or dissatisfied they were with the way they were treated when the contact was made.\textsuperscript{11} Readers should note that these questions met with high rates of refusal -25% for the police and 20% for the Gendarmerie - in contrast to the low refusal rates of around 1% in the questions on police contact. The reluctance to answer questions about satisfaction may be skewed towards those who were dissatisfied; this group might be more concerned that these views might somehow be revealed to ISFs. In other words the survey may overstate levels of satisfaction with contacts, if those who refused to answer the questions felt negative about their experiences. Comparing the Turkish findings with the UK sample of the European Social Survey data, 38% of UK respondents reported contact with the police, and none of them 'refused' to provide their evaluation of the contact. Of those who had contact, 68% were satisfied, 11% neither, and 21% dissatisfied.

\textit{Figure 3.5: Satisfaction with Contact}

There is a substantial difference between the levels of satisfaction between the police and the Gendarmerie. While the majority (61%) of respondents in contact with the Gendarmerie were satisfied with the treatment they received, only 40% of respondents in contact with the police were satisfied. Mirroring patterns of satisfaction, expression of dissatisfaction was 15 percentage points higher for the police than the Gendarmerie. In addition, when examining satisfaction levels according to whether contacts were ISF- and citizen-initiated contacts, respondents were - predictably - more dissatisfied with police-initiated contact than contacts they themselves had initiated (dissatisfaction for police-initiated contact: 24%; citizen-initiated contact: 16%). However the same did not apply to contacts with the Gendarmerie. Not a single respondent expressed dissatisfaction with Gendarmerie-initiated contact, whilst 10% did so for citizen-initiated contact. It is impossible to say whether this finding accurately reflects differences in satisfaction, or simply differences in respondents’ openness with interviewers, but it is a striking finding.

There was little gender variation in levels of satisfaction. Younger respondents (\textit{aged between 18 and 24}) are less satisfied with the contact in comparison to other age groups by approximately 10 percentage points. There was little variation in levels of satisfaction amongst those aged 25. In cities and district centres, respondents reported lower levels of

\textsuperscript{11}The survey asked about the respondent’s most recent contact.
dissatisfaction (16% dissatisfied) in comparison to respondents in villages (24%), but it should also be pointed out that the refusal rate was in cities/district centres was much higher at 40% compared with 17% in villages.

In terms of satisfaction levels in terms of reasons for contact, enforcement is the least satisfied contact, followed by suspicion and advice for ISF-initiated contact. This is not surprising as enforcement - getting arrested, getting a warning, receiving a fine, or being summoned - are all events which are unpleasant.\textsuperscript{12}

In summary, a small proportion (15%) of respondents had direct contact with the ISFs. For those who had contact, the type of contact as well as the reasons for contact were similar for both the police and the Gendarmerie. For both forces, contacts were more often ISF-initiated than citizen-initiated, that these ISF-initiated contacts related to suspicions about crime, or enforcement action. For both forces, citizen initiated contacts generally involved reporting of crimes or accidents. They appeared to engage less in seeking advice or help on wider problems.

Whilst patterns of contact were similar between the two forces, patterns of satisfaction were not. According to the survey, the Gendarmerie performed better than the police, for both ISF- and citizen-contacts.

\textsuperscript{12} Proportions for ‘dissatisfaction’ with: enforcement (36%), ‘suspicion’ (25%), and advice (18%).
4. Trust in ISFs

Comparison between Police and Gendarmerie

This chapter focuses on public perception of the ISFs. It differs from the previous chapter, which examined people’s actual experience with the ISFs. Citizens can ‘trust’ or ‘distrust’ the ISFs regardless of contact. For example, some citizens may have a negative opinion of the ISF due to their neighbours’ experience with the ISF; or some may have a positive opinion of the ISF because they have seen security forces solve heinous crimes in film or TV dramas. It is important to measure these perceptions – whether or not they are based on facts or experience – because it is these perceptions that most likely determine citizens’ willingness to cooperate with and assist the ISFs or to report crimes as witnesses, suspects or victims.

This part of the survey started with a question designed to capture citizens’ general assessment of ISF performance, asking ‘taking into account all the duties, powers and responsibilities given by the law to ISFs, would you say they are doing a good job or a bad job?’

Overall, 52% of respondents thought the ISF in their area\(^\text{13}\) was doing a good job. 31% said ‘neither good nor bad’, 13% said ‘bad job’ and 4% didn’t have a view or refused to answer. Looking at demographics, there was little difference between gender: 50% of males and 54% of females considered the ISFs were doing a good job. Trust levels were also similar between rural and urban settings: 45% of city/district centre respondents and 48% of village respondents considered the ISF to be doing a good job. Variations were seen in age groups and education levels. Younger respondents had less trust in the ISFs – 46% of those aged between 18 and 24 considered the ISFs were doing a good job; and rating increased progressively with age. Those aged 65 and above reported the highest trust (68%), resulting in a 22-percentage point difference between 18-24 age group and 65+. Education levels – measured by those with no formal education, primary school/secondary school graduate, high school graduate, and college/university graduate – showed that higher the respondent’s education, lower the trust. While 71% of respondents without any formal education rated the ISFs as doing a good job, only 45% of college/university graduate thought this was the case.

Comparisons can be made between the ratings of the Gendarmerie by residents in Gendarmerie areas and of police by residents in police areas residence is examined. The two charts on the left in Figure 4.1 shows that just under half of the police area residents feel the police are doing a good job (47%) whereas Gendarmerie residents rated the Gendarmerie much higher at 74%. These figures are consistent with the higher levels of satisfaction with Gendarmerie contact in the previous chapter. It is impossible to say whether the very high ratings of the Gendarmerie accurately reflect opinion, or whether other factors are at work such as response bias associated with social desirability or fears about anonymity. Even if these factors have played some part, it seems likely that the Gendarmerie enjoy strong public support.

---

\(^{13}\) There were two ways in which respondents could be classified as living in a police or Gendarmerie area. One question asked: ‘Over the last 2 years, have you lived in an area protected by the police or the Gendarmerie? (If you have moved homes during this period, choose the area where you have lived longest during this period).’ Additionally, the interviewed recorded their current area of residence. The two variables yielded very similar results when comparing attitudes to police.
Next, the evaluation of the ‘other’ security force is shown in the two charts on the right in Figure 4.1. It is not surprising that more respondents chose the ‘don’t know/refusal’ option as many will be unfamiliar with the other security force; however a ‘don’t know/refusal’ of over 40% for both the police and the Gendarmerie is a substantial proportion. Those who did offer an assessment of the ‘other’ ISF generally believed that their own ISF performed better. For instance, while 47% of police residents thought the police was doing a good job, only 30% thought the Gendarmerie did so. Similarly, though 74% Gendarmerie residents thought their ISF did a good job, only 40% thought the same of the police.

**Figure 4.1: Trust in the Police and the Gendarmerie**

**Police Residents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trust in Police</th>
<th>Trust in Gendarmerie</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>47%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Gendermarie Residents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trust in Gendarmerie</th>
<th>Trust in Police</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>74%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The question discussed above provides a measure of whether in very broad terms citizens trust the ISFs to do a good job. What follows is a more detailed analysis of ‘trust’, using a conceptual framework developed for the European Social Survey. Trust in an institution refers to the expectations that people may hold about them. The first component of trust is whether citizens expect the ISFs to treat citizens in a fair and respectful manner, listening to them, explaining their decisions (usually referred to as procedural justice). The second component is about treating different groups in the same way (usually referred to as distributive justice); survey measures can ask, for example, whether people believe that the police treat rich and poor in the same way. The third component of trust relates to effectiveness of the ISFs – or whether people feel that the ISFs have basic competence in preventing crimes, and answering calls for assistance promptly, for example.

In the following sections, unless specifically noted, results refer to assessments of the Gendarmerie only by those living in Gendarmerie areas and assessments of the police only by those living in police areas, due to the high volume of ‘don’t knows/refusal’ seen above.
Fair and Equal Treatment by ISFs

The survey measured trust in distributive justice through a question that asked: ‘when victims report crimes, do you think the ISFs treat some people differently from different segments or is everyone treated equally?’ The term ‘segment’ could be interpreted in a number of ways from race and ethnicity, religion, political affiliation, social strata and so forth. Whatever ‘segment’ the respondent had in mind, again, a disparity between the police and the Gendarmerie is clear, with 67% of respondents in Gendarmerie areas thinking that the Gendarmerie provide equal treatment for all, as opposed to 47% for those living in police areas.

Figure 4.2: Trust in Equality of Treatment

‘Everyone treated equally regardless of the segment they are representing’

Three further questions asked respondents about trust in procedural fairness:

- ‘Based on what you have heard or own experience, how often would you say the ISFs generally treat people with respect?’
- ‘About how often would you say that the ISFs make fair, impartial decisions in the cases they deal with?’
- ‘When dealing with people, how often would you say the ISFs generally explain their decisions and actions when asked to do so?’

These items were combined into a single scale to represent fair and respectful treatment of citizens (α=.79). The scale ranged from 1 to 10, 1 being unfair and disrespectful and 10 being fair and respectful. The mean value for police and the Gendarmerie were 5.9 and 7.7 respectively. Gendarmerie respondents skewed towards a highly favourable rating of the Gendarmerie’s procedural fairness, whereas the police respondents show a bimodal distribution peaking at scores 4 and 7 (see Figure 4.3).

14 This question is not taken from any international surveys, and was created for the purpose of this survey
Figure 4.3: Trust in Fair and Respectful Treatment

Police: 5.9 (mean), 2.27 (standard deviation)
Gendarmerie: 7.7 (mean), 2.02 (standard deviation)

Trust in Effectiveness of ISFs

In measuring citizens trust in the effectiveness of the ISFs, three outcome measures were used: their effectiveness in prevention, catching offenders, and the swiftness in response. These questions (see Figure 4.4) were measured by an 11-point scale, 0 being least effective and 10 being most effective. The results for all three questions confirm what has been the consistent theme of this Report, which is that Gendarmerie respondents rated their ISF effectiveness higher than police respondents’ rating of their ISF.

Bearing in mind that the Gendarmerie police large rural parts of Turkey, it is somewhat surprising that Gendarmerie residents think that they would be quick (score of 9.4) at arriving at the scene of the crime.
Figure 4.4: Trust in Effectiveness

- **How Successful at Preventing Violent Crimes**
  - Police: 5.8
  - Gendarmerie: 7.9

- **How Successful at Catching Burglars**
  - Police: 5.3
  - Gendarmerie: 7.1

- **How Quick at Arriving at the Scene of Violent Crime**
  - Police: 6.3
  - Gendarmerie: 9.4

Exploring Links Between Satisfaction and Trust

This section explores the link between contact – addressed in the previous section – and trust. As noted above, there was no link between police-initiated and citizen-initiated contact with levels of satisfaction. However, a strong relationship was found between satisfaction and trust. In particular, levels of satisfaction with contact were highly correlated with both ‘trust in procedural fairness’ and ‘trust in effectiveness’. Trust in procedural fairness was measured by a scale constructed from responses to three questions, as described above, as was trust in effectiveness. Both scales ranged from 1-10.

Results showed that levels of satisfaction with contact were highly correlated with both trust in fairness and trust in effectiveness. Trust in effectiveness (police: \( r = .5, p < .01 \); Gendarmerie: \( r = .62, p < .01 \)) had a slightly stronger relationship with levels of satisfaction in comparison to trust in fairness (police: \( r = .46, p < .01 \); Gendarmerie: \( r = .41, p < .01 \)). In a survey of this sort it is not possible to say whether satisfaction with contact leads to trust in fairness and effectiveness, or whether those who trust their ISF and are well disposed towards them generally tend to receive better treatment. But it is a reasonable assumption that competent and fair treatment of the public is an important factor in shaping trust in ISFs.

\(^{15}\text{Pearson correlation: .096 (p=.06)}\)
5. Legitimacy of the ISFs

Legitimacy of ISFs

Legitimacy is a related but separate concept to ‘trust’. A legitimate ISF is one that is regard as entitled to exercise authority. Those who confer legitimacy on an institution feel an ‘obligation to obey’ that institution, and consent to its authority. And the obligation to obey is a particular sort of obligation, grounded not simply on the coercive powers that the institution can deploy. Rather, citizens offer their consent because they think that the institution shares moral values with them, and acts legally, playing by its own rules for legitimate institutions, the sense of obligation Legitimacy in the ESS is measured by three sub-concepts. The Turkish survey focused on one of these concepts: felt obligation to obey. (The other concepts are described in more detail in the following chapter).

The sense of obligation to obey the ISF is measured by three questions asking whether they though the ISF should be obeyed regardless of the reasons and regardless of the manner of the officer (see box below). The three questions were put into a single scale (α =.86) ranging from 0 to 10, where 0 indicated no sense of obligation to obey. Unlike the previous sections, police and Gendarmerie respondents show very similar patterns of felt obligation towards the ISFs.

Questions measuring ‘obligation to obey’ – the key dimension of ISF legitimacy

• To what extent do you obey the discretionary decisions made by ISFs, even when you disagree with them?

• To what extent is it your duty to do what the ISFs tell you even if you don’t understand or agree with the reasons?

• To what extent is it your duty to do what the ISFs tell you to do, even if you don’t like how they treat you?
A linear regression predicting the felt obligation to obey the ISFs showed that trust in procedural fairness and effectiveness as the most powerful predictors ($R^2 = .2$). The rest of the variables show much less explanatory power. Contact – whether or not respondents had contact with ISFs in the last two years – was a positive and statistically significant predictor of the felt duty to obey the ISFs. *(The model does not include levels of satisfaction with contact as the inclusion of this variable would have significantly reduced the total number of cases included in the analysis.)* Demographics also played a minimum role in explaining obligation to obey. Gender, age, and level education did not appear to be associated with legitimacy, but those living in villages tended to confer more legitimacy on their ISF than those in towns and cities.

So far, this report has highlighted the differences between the police and the Gendarmerie: the latter generally emerge with more positive ratings which consistently showed better results for the Gendarmerie. The regression analysis shows that whether you live in a police area or a Gendarmerie area is a statistically significant predictor of legitimacy *(as measured by people’s sense of obligation to obey)*. The regression analysis also shows that contact is a significant predictor, with contact predicting reduced sense of obligation to obey. Finally, trust in fairness and trust in effectiveness are significant predictors of legitimacy. The analysis presented in Figure 5.2 is intended to indicate the relative strength of these different sets of predictors. Variables were entered into the regression analysis sequentially in four blocks. These were: contact; whether respondents lived in police or
Gendarmerie areas; demographics; and trust. The trust block was by far the strongest predictor; and trust in effectiveness had twice as much explanatory power than trust in procedural fairness.

**Figure 5.2: Explaining Felt Duty to Obey the ISFs**

![Graph showing the explained variance for each block of variables]

**Notes:**
1. Figures show the $R^2$-squared value (an indicator of explanatory power) for each block.
2. Contact: whether respondents had contact with ISFs in the last two years
3. Which ISF: police residents and Gendarmerie residents
4. Demographics: gender, age-group, education, and living in city or rural area
5. Trust: trust in effectiveness, and trust in procedural fairness.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$B$</th>
<th>$SEB$</th>
<th>$B$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact</td>
<td>-.42</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>-.52*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Which ISF</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Group</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City/Village</td>
<td>-.57</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.10*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural Fairness</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.13*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.37*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:**

$R^2 = .227$, *p<.001, N=2,098
6. Turkey in International Context

This chapter explores how Turkish ISFs were evaluated by the public in comparison to other European countries. The dataset used for comparative analysis is Round 5 of the European Social Survey (ESS) which was administered in late 2010.\(^{16}\) The Turkish data was merged with the ESS dataset for comparison.

**Overall Trust**

To capture overall trust in the police, the ESS used the question discussed in the previous chapter asking how good a job the police are doing. For many countries covered by the ESS there was only one type of police force; but in others such as France and Italy, there were two or more separate police forces, as in Turkey. However it was judged technically impossible to tailor the survey to reflect each country’s particular policing arrangements. Instead, the survey asked people simply about *the police*, and did not differentiate between various ISFs. It is a reasonable assumption that most respondents would have answered questions about policing by reference to the ISF operating in their area.

A decision was made in the Turkish survey to cover the main ISFs in separate questions. This makes good sense, given the purpose of the survey, but it makes comparison with the ESS a little complex. In the Turkish survey all respondents were asked about both the police and the Gendarmerie – although as discussed in the previous chapter, less than two thirds of interviewees had views about the ISF that did not police their own areas. The best way of comparing the results of the Turkish survey to the ESS is to combine questions about both ISFs, counting attitudes to the police only in those areas covered by the police, and attitudes to the Gendarmerie only in areas covered by the Gendarmerie. Published findings for the ESS generally exclude ‘don’t know’ and ‘refused’ responses from the analysis – unlike the findings presented in the previous chapter – where these responses have been included. Consistent with other ESS analysis, this chapter excludes *don’t know* and *refused* responses from the Turkish survey, as a result of which figures are marginally different to those in the previous chapter.

**Figure 6.1** compares Turkey with the 27 countries taking part in the ESS, on the question asking *how good a job* the police do. Judged against the percentage saying that the police do a good job, the Turkish ISFs fall in the middle third of the *league table*, ahead of most of the ex-communist countries, Israel, Portugal, Cyprus and Greece.

\(^{16}\)Although ESS fieldwork took place just over four years before the national survey, it is unlikely that the rank order of countries would be substantially different if the ESS module had been carried out more recently. However, some countries will have changed policing levels or strategies recently, and this will affect ratings.
Country Groups

The remainder of findings in this chapter compare the Turkish ISFs against ESS country groups, rather than comparing 27 countries individually. This is simply to make the findings more accessible. The classification of countries used here is derived broadly from Esping-Andersen’s\textsuperscript{17} categorisation of national approaches to welfare policy – conservative, liberal and social-democratic. The classification closely resembles, and borrows from, that of Cavadino and Dignan.\textsuperscript{18}


The ESS asked a range of questions about trust in police effectiveness, trust in police fairness and beliefs about police legitimacy. To measure each concept, such as trust in fairness, several questions were asked, and the rest of this chapter presents only a limited selection of possible comparisons. In each section, scores are presented for the Turkish ISFs combined, and for the police and Gendarmerie separately. The findings are presented using ‘spidergram’ graphics. Each country-group is located on the ‘spider’s web’ according to its score: country-groups with low (or undesirable) scores are located close to the centre of the web, and those with high scores are placed on the edge of the web. It is not possible to make international comparisons for all dimensions of trust and legitimacy, as not all ESS measures could be included in the Turkish survey.

**Trust in Effectiveness**

One of the questions used to measure trust in effectiveness related to expectations of response times. Respondents were asked how long the ISF would take to arrive at the scene of a violent crime. Figure 6.2 shows that although there is not a great deal of variation between country groups, the Turkish ISFs score highest on this measure of effectiveness. One possible explanation of these very positive findings is that Turkey is a low-crime country, and few Turkish citizens will have experience of reporting a violent crime to the police. As a result, few will have firm views about the speed with which the ISFs should, and would, respond.

**Country Groups Used in This Analysis**

- **UK & Ireland**
  (Germany, France, Belgium, Switzerland, and the Netherlands)
- **Western Europe**
  (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden);
- **Nordic**
  (Spain, Greece, Portugal, and Cyprus);
- **Southern Europe**
  (Bulgaria, Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Ukraine, Russia, Croatia, and Slovenia);
- **Post-communist**
  (Bulgaria, Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Ukraine, Russia, Croatia, and Slovenia);
- **Israel**
Figure 6.2: Trust in ISF Effectiveness: International Comparison

![Graph showing trust in ISF in different regions](image)

Note: Question wording: ‘If a violent crime were to occur near to where you live and the [ISFs/police] were called how slowly or quickly do you think they would arrive at the scene? Choose your answer from this card, where 0 is extremely slowly and 10 is extremely quickly.’

**Trust in Procedural Fairness**

The ESS used several questions to measure trust in the procedural fairness of the police. The findings presented in

*Figure 6.3* show whether people think that decisions made by ISFs are fair and impartial. The Turkish ISFs fall below the Nordic countries, the UK & Ireland and Southern and Western Europe.

*
Figure 6.3: Trust in ISF Fairness: International Comparison

Note: question wording was: ‘About how often would you say that the ISFs make fair, impartial decisions in the cases they deal with? Would you say not at all often, not very often, often, always?’

The very low ratings given by Israelis is surprising, especially given the high levels of legitimacy that the Israeli police appear to enjoy (discussed below). This lack of a close relationship between trust in procedural justice and legitimacy may reflect that country's unusually fragile levels of security, and the resultant sense of duty to obey the police, even if they are not trusted to act fairly.

Looking at Turkish ISFs separately, the Gendarmerie score very highly on this measure, performing slightly better than Western European countries, and only slightly worse than Nordic countries and the UK/Ireland. The police in Turkey score considerably lower, in line with ex-communist countries.

Legitimacy

The ESS identified three key dimensions to public perceptions of legitimacy. People are judged to confer legitimacy on the police when:

- They have a sense of obligation to obey the police
- This sense of obligation derived from shared moral values
- And a belief that the police act legally.

Due to the survey design, the Turkish survey can be compared with measures in the ESS on the first two dimensions of legitimacy, but not the third.
Obligation to Obey

The Turkish ISFs emerge as scoring highly on this measure of legitimacy, as Figure 6.4 shows. Looking at the separate ISFs, the Gendarmerie share the highest average score with the police in the Nordic country group and with the Israeli police, which as noted above, has unusually high levels of legitimacy. The police emerge on a par with the UK and Ireland, and with Western and Southern Europe, and higher than the post-communist countries.

Figure 6.4: Obligation to Obey ISF: International Comparison

Note: Question wording was: ‘To what extent do you obey the discretionary decisions made by ISFs, even when you disagree with them? Choose your answer from this card where “0” is not at all obey, “10” is completely obey.’

Moral Alignment

Finally, comparisons can be made between the National Survey and the ESS on measures of moral alignment (Figure 6.5). Looking at ISFs separately, there is a marked contrast between the Gendarmerie and the police. The former have average scores which are higher than all country groups except the Nordic countries and the UK and Ireland; the only country with scores lower than the Turkish police is Israel.

The overall picture to emerge from these international comparisons is that Turkey emerges as high on trust in effectiveness and less high on trust in fairness. On one dimension of legitimacy – the sense of obligation to obey ISFs, Turkey is comparable to other European countries. On moral alignment – another dimension of legitimacy – it scores less well.
Looking at the Turkish ISFs separately, the Gendarmerie appear to be an ISF that, relative to other countries, enjoys high levels of trust and high levels of legitimacy. Given that Turkey has relatively low crime rates, the high levels of Gendarmerie legitimacy could be a consequence of high levels of public trust in effectiveness, high levels of public trust in fairness or a mixture of the two.

The police, by contrast, emerge low on trust in fairness but score well on trust in effectiveness relative to other countries. They also score highly on perceived legitimacy. A research avenue worth exploring is whether these high levels of legitimacy reflect public trust in their effectiveness. Whatever the case, it seems likely, on the basis of international patterns, that the police could increase their legitimacy further if they managed to improve public perceptions of their fairness.
7. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

This report provides a framework within which to examine the public’s attitudes towards the two main ISFs in Turkey. In interpreting the survey findings, it must be remembered that questionnaires cannot never claim to measure perfectly complex attitudes towards institutions such as the ISFs. Trust in authority, and the legitimacy that people place in authority, are subtle concepts, and the survey cannot claim to portray public attitudes exhaustively or with complete accuracy.

However, the main findings from the survey are quite clear. The Turkish public has quite low levels of contact with the police – as might be expected in a low-crime country. Overall, a large minority of those with contact were satisfied. Overall, a majority of the public – though not a large majority – thought that the ISFs did a good job, and Turkey fell within the middle third of European countries with which it could be compared. Measures of trust in ISF effectiveness suggest that ISFs emerge well, both in absolute terms and relative to other countries. Measures of trust in fairness are lower. In terms of the legitimacy that ISFs have in the eyes of the public, ratings were quite high on measures of ‘obligation to obey’, and lower on measures of ‘moral alignment’. Attitudes to the police were more negative than towards the Gendarmerie, though part of the reason for this may be that results were more skewed in Gendarmerie areas by responses shaped by social desirability.

The survey gives some indication of the dynamics of attitudes to the police. Contact with the police, especially as a suspect, tends to result (unsurprisingly) in low satisfaction. Low satisfaction with contact is associated with low trust. And low trust is associated with low legitimacy. Trust in police effectiveness emerged as the strongest predictor of legitimacy, but trust in police fairness was also an important factor.

These findings are broadly consistent with international research on trust in the police and on police legitimacy. In Western Europe, contact emerges as very important in determining levels of trust (satisfaction with contact being the mediating factor); and trust in the police is appears to be an important determinant of public perceptions of police legitimacy. The particular significance of trust in effectiveness as a predictor of legitimacy in the Turkish survey is inconsistent with analysis of the European Social Survey (where trust in fairness is more important). However research in other countries has found results on trust in effectiveness that are similar to the Turkish findings. The findings from this survey also seem consistent with what little previous research there is on this subject in Turkey.19

Interpreting these findings requires sensitivity to Turkish culture and traditions, which the authors of this report cannot claim. Research into the relationships between trust and legitimacy suggests that the drivers of legitimacy may be consistent across countries and cultures, even if the relative weight of trust in effectiveness and trust in fairness as drivers of legitimacy may vary between countries. There are countries with atypical relationships between trust and legitimacy, such as Israel. The particular history of Turkey as the crossroads between East and West – both geographically and culturally – may possibly make it another outlier. However, the safest assumption to make is that in Turkey, no less than

other countries, the surest route for building or consolidating ISF legitimacy is to improve public trust in the police and Gendarmerie. And if other countries are a reliable guide, improving people’s experience of contact with the police is likely to be an important way of improving trust.

There are many questions that this report cannot answer satisfactorily. The consistent difference in ratings between the police and the Gendarmerie is striking, and further research is probably needed to establish whether the difference is reliable, and if so, what lies behind it. Further analysis by particular sub-groups and by geographical region is desirable, to get a fuller understanding of where legitimacy is strong, and where there is room for improvement. And, of course, if the ISFs decide to engage in strategies that focus on improving ISF legitimacy there will be value in replicating this survey – or key parts of it – in order to provide information on trends.
Appendix 1 - Technical Report

The survey was carried out by Ipsos Social Research Institute, Turkey. It comprised a quota sample of 3,619 members of the Turkish public, aged 18 or over. Fieldwork took place between 9 December 2014 – 23 January 2015. Interviews were carried out in interviewees’ home using computer assisted personal interviewing (CAPI).

The following quotas were used to create a nationally representative sample: the distribution of the population between police and gendarmerie areas; age; gender; and educational attainment. The Mol provided information on the split between police and gendarmerie areas in Turkey. The 2013 Address Based Population Registration System Results of TURKSTAT (Turkish Statistical Institute) were used to create quotas for demographics.

The original sampling framework was adjusted due to new legislation for metropolitan municipalities - Büyükşehir Yasası - which came into force in April 2014. Some areas that had been previously been categorised as ‘rural’ were redefined as ‘urban’ under the new legislation. This meant that some gendarmerie areas became police areas after April 2014. A list of all neighbourhoods with their classification as police and gendarmerie areas were provided by the Mol. Table A1 provides the quotas designed for the sample, and Table A2 provides a breakdown of the actual achieved sample, 3% over target.

Table A3 provides information on response rates. Interviews took in 16% of eligible households. Although this is a high refusal rate by some standards, the correspondence between set quotas and the achieved sample was good. In combination with the use of rim weights (a simple form of calibration weighting) discussed below, this should have ensured that the sample was reasonably representative. It is impossible to say whether compliance with requests to take part in surveys is correlated with positive attitudes towards authorities, but it is possible that the sample design may have yielded some sample bias.
## Table A1: Quotas for the Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>18-24</th>
<th>25-34</th>
<th>35-44</th>
<th>45-54</th>
<th>55-64</th>
<th>65+</th>
<th>Primary School and Below</th>
<th>High School</th>
<th>Higher Education</th>
<th>Gendarmerie</th>
<th>Police</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adana</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ağrı</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aksaray</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antalya</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aydın</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balıkesir</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bursa</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erzurum</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaziantep</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hatay</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İstanbul</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İzmir</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kastamonu</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kayseri</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kocaeli</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konya</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malatya</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manisa</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mardin</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordu</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samsun</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Şanlıurfa</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sivas</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tekirdağ</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trabzon</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zonguldak</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3500</strong></td>
<td><strong>1735</strong></td>
<td><strong>1765</strong></td>
<td><strong>560</strong></td>
<td><strong>849</strong></td>
<td><strong>733</strong></td>
<td><strong>584</strong></td>
<td><strong>405</strong></td>
<td><strong>369</strong></td>
<td><strong>2268</strong></td>
<td><strong>763</strong></td>
<td><strong>469</strong></td>
<td><strong>703</strong></td>
<td><strong>2797</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table A2: Achieved Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framework</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>Type of ISF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>18-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adana</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ağrı</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aksaray</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antalya</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aydın</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balıkesir</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bursa</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erzurum</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaziantep</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hatay</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İstanbul</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İzmir</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kastamounu</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kayseri</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kocaeli</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konya</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malatya</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manisa</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mardin</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordu</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samsun</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Şanlıurfa</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sivas</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tekirdağ</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trabzon</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zonguldak</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3619</strong></td>
<td><strong>1789</strong></td>
<td><strong>1830</strong></td>
<td><strong>623</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Table A3: Refusal/Response Rates**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Refusal/Response Rates</th>
<th>Number of Households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Visited Households</strong></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>38,785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Screening</strong></td>
<td>79 % (households that opened their doors)</td>
<td>30,672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eligibility</strong></td>
<td>74% (screened households eligible for an interview)</td>
<td>22,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Refusal</strong></td>
<td>84% (eligible households refused to take part in the interview)</td>
<td>19,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Response</strong></td>
<td>16% (eligible households that took part in the interview)</td>
<td>3,619</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Weights**

Rim weighting was used to calculate weighting coefficients. The coefficients were calculated based on planned and actual counts of each quota (*age*, *sex*, *education level*, *city*, *gendarmerie and police area*). The Rim Weighting Efficiency values are as follows:

**Weighting Efficiency of National Data:**

- *Rim Weighting Efficiency*: 99.8%
- *Maximum Respondent Rim Weight*: 1.050000
- *Minimum Respondent Rim Weight*: 0.666667

**Weighting Efficiency of Local Data:**

- *Rim Weighting Efficiency*: 99.9%
- *Maximum Respondent Rim Weight*: 1.021390
- *Minimum Respondent Rim Weight*: 0.924765

**Selection of Sampling Points**

The *‘Random Walk’* method was used to locate households from each sampling point, and the *‘Next Birthday’* method was used to select the eligible respondent within each household. Ipsos limited the maximum number of interviews to be conducted in any one street to ten. The detail of the process was as follows.

- Random walk methodology was used for household selection in streets. After the neighborhood was selected, the streets were identified. The interviews started in the first building with the smallest odd door number. In apartments with up to 10 flats, one interview was
allowed. For apartment blocks with more than 11 flats, a maximum of two interviews were allowed.

- If three interviews could not be completed on the odd numbered side of the street, the interviewers crossed street and interviews were done from the house with the biggest even door number to the smallest even door number.

- When the door was opened, interviewer asked the names and birth dates of all household members. If more than one household member was eligible, the interviewer conducted the interview with the person with the closest birthday (‘next birthday method’).

**Fieldwork**

The fieldwork team was divided into six regions. The fieldwork teams consisted of a supervisor and five interviewers in each region (with the exception of İstanbul where there were three supervisors and 15 interviewers). A total of eight controllers were assigned for quality assurance. Both supervisors and controllers were instructed via face-to-face briefing sessions.

**Limitations**

There were some problems in achieving the desired sample, including weather conditions, issues of personal safety, and unoccupied homes (especially summer houses).

**Weather Conditions**

A village in Trabzon (Çaykara Demirkapı) was replaced with another village in Trabzon (Akçaabat Ortaalan) due to heavy snow preventing interviewers from carrying out their fieldwork.

**Criminal Areas**

The fieldwork team in Gaziantep had difficulties in conducting the survey in some of the neighbourhoods with high levels of criminality. Fieldwork team did not want to go into these neighbourhoods since some of the local people (small shop owners, taxi drivers etc.) warned them that there is a tension between residents and the ISFs and that even ISFs have difficulties to provide security in these neighbourhoods.

The Ipsos fieldwork team insisted on conducting some interviews at these neighbourhoods but solved the issue by decreasing the number of interviewers in order to avoid engaging too much attention from local people while conducting the survey.

**Empty Houses (Summer Houses)**

Due to the high proportion of summer houses in İzmir Çeşme, it was difficult to complete the number of interviews required during the winter when fieldwork took place. The quota for
the neighbourhoods was relaxed and interviews that could not be carried out were re-assigned to fieldwork for other transferred to adjacent neighbourhoods. Thus the response rates of that region should be reviewed accordingly.

**Respondents above 65+**

Reaching respondents aged 65 and above was difficult in Vakfikebir, Trabzon. They may be registered as residents but they often do not live there especially in winter. Although the team managed to interview respondents aged 65 and above with the guidance of local administrative officer (muhtar) 43, interviews in this age group could not be completed. These were distributed to other age groups proportionally with the approval of UNDP.

**Willingness to Take Part**

The majority of respondents had no problems in understanding and answering the questions, with the exception of those aged 65 and over, those with little education, and those living in eastern areas such as Middle-east and South-east Anatolia. While most respondents were enthusiastic in answering questions, respondents in Istanbul were less so due to their busy lifestyle; survey fatigue (arising from participation in previous surveys) also seemed to be a factor.

**Logic Checks**

Logic checks were carried out for the following questions:

- **Contact with ISF in the last 2 years;**
- **Number of contacts with the ISF in the last 2 years;**
- **Length of time living in the current address (checked against the date of birth);**
- **Respondents’ occupation (checked against their activity in the last 7 days);**
- **Respondents’ occupation (checked against their age); and**
- **Occupation of the breadwinner within households.**

Respondents were re-contacted again if they had reported more than ten contacts with the ISFs. These figures were corrected unless an explanation was given for the high number of contacts. These included “meeting ISFs regularly due to the respondents’ conditional discharge from prison” or “living/working in area where frequent traffic/ID controls occur”.

Some respondents stated that they had contact with ISFs once but stated more than one reason for the contacts. These responses arose from situations where, for example, ISFs conducted stop-and-search as well as conducting an identity check.

Some respondents stated their occupation as “housewife” but also stated that they are the “breadwinner” of the household. This could mean they receive benefit income due to having a disabled children/partner, for example, or get payments from social security system due to death in the family.
Appendix 2 - Questionnaire

SECTION 1: SCREENING and CONTACT QUESTIONS

- Over the last 2 years, have you lived in an area protected by...? *(If you have moved homes during this period, choose the area where you have lived longest during this period)*
  1. Police
  2. Gendarmerie
     (88 Refusal)
     (99 Don’t know)

- Over the last 2 years, regardless of where you currently reside, have you had any contact\(^\text{20}\) with ISFs?
  1. No contact – skip to the section 2
  2. Yes – to question 3
     (88 Refusal) – skip to the next section
     (99 Don’t know) – skip to the next section

*(For those who had contact)* Over the last 2 years, roughly how many times were you in contact with the ISFs?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(88 Refusal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(99 Don’t know)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(For those who had contact)* Of those contacts, how many were ISF initiated and how many were initiated by you?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of ISF initiated</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Gendarmerie</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of citizen initiated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Now I want to ask about your most RECENT encounter with the ISFs.

- Which ISF was your most RECENT encounter?
  1. Police
  2. Gendarmerie
     (88 Refusal) skip to the next section
     (99 Don’t know) skip to the next section

\(^{20}\)Contact means the ISFs approaching or stopping or making contact for any reason, or the interviewee approaching the ISFs.
• What type of contact was it?
  1. ISF initiated contact
  2. Citizen initiated contact
     (88 Refusal)
     (99 Don’t know)

• (Those who chose ‘ISF initiated contact’) What type of ISF initiated contact was it?
  1. Gave an on the spot warning about offence committed
     (includes traffic and parking violation)
  2. Tried to calm down a fight/argument
  3. Said they would issue a summons
  4. Made an arrest
  5. Carried out a breath test
  6. Issued a fine
  7. Told to take documents to the police station
  8. Gave a warning about a vehicle fault/maintenance
  9. Gave some advice about driving
 10. Searched you
 11. Carried out an identity check
 12. Just asked questions
 13. None of these
     (88 Refusal)
     (99 Don’t know)

• (Those who chose ‘citizen initiated contact’) What type of citizen initiated contact was it?
  1. Reporting a crime which happened to myself or others
  2. Reporting a road accident which happened to myself or others
  3. Asking for help with a non-crime problem (e.g. noisy neighbour, parking space problem, missing pet, etc.)
  4. Asking for help with a crime-related problem (e.g. drug dealing on the streets, domestic violence, stranger in neighbourhood, etc.)
  5. Obtaining administrative documents at [police/Gendarmarie/Zabita/] station
  6. Reporting a complaint against the law enforcement officer
  7. None of these
     (88 Refusal)
     (99 Don’t know)
• About your most recent encounter, how dissatisfied or satisfied were you with the way the ISF\textsuperscript{21} treated you?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Gendarmerie</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Very Dissatisfied</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Dissatisfied</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Neither Dissatisfied nor Satisfied</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Satisfied</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Very Satisfied</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(88 Refusal)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(99 Don’t know)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION 2: TRUST IN THE ISFs

In this section, please answer the following questions based on what you have heard or your own experience.

• Taking into account all the duties, powers and responsibilities given by the law to ISFs, would you say they are doing a good job or a bad job?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Gendarmerie</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Very Good Job</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Good Job</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Neither Good nor Bad Job</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Bad Job</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Very Bad Job</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(88 Refusal)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(99 Don’t know)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Now some questions about whether or not the ISFs treat\textsuperscript{22} victims of crime equally. Please answer based on your own experience.

• When victims report\textsuperscript{23} crimes, do you think the ISFs treat rich people worse, poor people worse, or are rich and poor treated equally? Choose your answer from this card.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Gendarmerie</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Rich people treated worse</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Poor people treated worse</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Rich people treated better</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Poor people treated better</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Rich and poor treated equally</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(88 Refusal)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(99 Don’t know)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{21} ‘Treated’ in the sense of how the ISF responded to or dealt with the respondent.

\textsuperscript{22} ‘Treat in the sense of how the ISF respond to and deal with people.

\textsuperscript{23} ‘Report in the sense of ‘report in person’ so that the ISFs can see them.’
• And when victims report crimes, do you think the ISFs treat some people differently from different segments or is everyone treated equally? Choose your answer from this card.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Gendarmerie</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. People are treated in relation to the segment they are representing?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Everyone treated equally regardless of the segment they are representing.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(88 Refusal)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(99 Don’t know)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• Based on what you have heard or your own experience how successful do you think the ISFs are at preventing crimes where violence is used or threatened? Choose your answer from this card, where 0 is extremely unsuccessful and 10 is extremely successful.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Gendarmerie</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State a number between 0-10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(88 Refusal)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(99 Don’t know)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• And how successful do you think the ISFs are at catching people who commit house burglaries? Choose your answer from this card where 0 is extremely unsuccessful and 10 is extremely successful.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Gendarmerie</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State a number between 0-10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(88 Refusal)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(99 Don’t know)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• If a violent crime were to occur near to where you live and the ISFs were called, how slowly or quickly do you think they would arrive at the scene? Choose your answer from this card, where 0 is extremely slowly and 10 is extremely quickly.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Gendarmerie</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State a number between 0-10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(55 Violent crimes never occur where I live)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(88 Refusal)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(99 Don’t know)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

24 House burglary is when someone breaks into a property or enters uninvited with the intention of stealing.

25 ‘Violent crime’ meaning crimes where violence is used or threatened.

26 Called in the sense of telephoned.
• Now some questions about when the ISFs deal with crimes like house burglary and physical assault. Based on what you have heard or your own experience how often would you say the ISFs generally treat people with respect?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Gendarmerie</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Not at all often</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Not very often</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Often</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Always</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(88 Refusal)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(99 Don't know)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• About \(^{27}\) how often would you say that the ISFs make fair, impartial\(^{28}\) decisions in the cases they deal with? Would you say...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Gendarmerie</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Not at all often</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Not very often</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Often</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Always</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(88 Refusal)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(99 Don't know)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• And when dealing with people, how often would you say the ISFs generally explain their decisions and actions when asked to do so?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Gendarmerie</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Not at all often</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Not very often</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Often</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Always</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. (No one ever asks the Police/ Gendarmerie to explain their decisions and actions)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(88 Refusal)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(99 Don't know)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

\(^{27}\) *About in the sense of approximately or roughly*

\(^{28}\) *Fair, impartial* - in British English the use of both of these words clarifies the meaning of 'fair' in the context of this question. Countries should ensure that impartiality is conveyed.
• Now some questions about your duty towards the ISFs. Use this card where 0 is not at all your duty and 10 is completely your duty.

To what extent do you obey the discretionary decisions made by ISFs, even when you disagree with them? Choose your answer from this card where “0” is not at all obey, “10” is completely obey.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Gendarmerie</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State a number between 0-10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(88 Refusal)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(99 Don’t know)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• To what extent is it your duty to do what the ISFs tell you even if you don’t understand or agree with the reasons?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Gendarmerie</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State a number between 0-10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(88 Refusal)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(99 Don’t know)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• To what extent is it your duty to do what the ISFs tell you to do, even if you don’t like how they treat you?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Gendarmerie</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State a number between 0-10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(88 Refusal)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(99 Don’t know)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• Using this card, please say to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about the ISFs. I generally support how the ISF agents act.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Gendarmerie</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Agree Strongly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Agree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Neither agree nor disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Disagree Strongly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(88 Refusal)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(99 Don’t know)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• “The actions of ISF agents are too often influenced by political view points”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Gendarmerie</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Agree Strongly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Agree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Neither agree nor disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Disagree Strongly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(88 Refusal)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(99 Don’t know)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• How often would you say that the ISFs act unlawfully? Choose your answer from this card where 0 is never and 10 is always.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Gendarmerie</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State a number between 0-10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(88 Refusal)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(99 Don’t know)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using this card please tell me how wrong it is to do the following.

• How wrong is it to make tax evasion?

1. Not wrong at all
2. A bit wrong
3. Wrong
4. Seriously wrong
   (88 Refusal)
   (99 Don’t know)

• How wrong is it to buy something you thought might be stolen?

1. Not wrong at all
2. A bit wrong
3. Wrong
4. Seriously wrong
   (88 Refusal)
   (99 Don’t know)
• How wrong is it to commit a traffic offence like speeding or crossing a red light?
  1. Not wrong at all
  2. A bit wrong
  3. Wrong
  4. Seriously wrong
     (88 Refusal)
     (99 Don’t know)

• Now just suppose you were to do any of these things. Please tell me how likely it is that someone would be caught and punished if someone were to do the following.

Bought something you thought might be stolen?
  1. Not at all likely
  2. Not very Likely
  3. Likely
  4. Very likely
     (88 Refusal)
     (99 Don’t know)

• Committed a traffic offence like speeding or crossing a red light?
  1. Not at all likely
  2. Not very Likely
  3. Likely
  4. Very likely
     (88 Refusal)
     (99 Don’t know)

• Please tell me how often you have done each of these things in the last five years?

How often have you bought something you thought might be stolen?
  1. Never
  2. Once
  3. Twice
  4. 3 or 4 times
  5. 5 times or more
     (88 Refusal)
     (99 Don’t know)
• How often have you committed a traffic offence like speeding or crossing a red light?

1. Never
2. Once
3. Twice
4. 3 or 4 times
5. 5 times or more
   (88 Refusal)
   (99 Don’t know)

SECTION 3: DEMOGRAPHICS

• Now, I would like to ask you some details about yourself and others in your household.

What year were you born?

Gender

1. Male
2. Female
   (88 Refusal)
   (99 Don’t know)

• About how many years of education have you completed, whether full-time or part-time? Please report these in full-time equivalents and include compulsory years of schooling. INTERVIEWER NOTE: round answer up or down to the nearest whole year.

XX
(88 Refusal)
(99 Don’t know)

• Using this card, which of these descriptions applies to what you have been doing for the last 7 days? Select all that apply.

1. In paid work (or away temporarily) (employee, self-employed, working for your family business)
2. In education, (not paid for by employer) even if on vacation
3. Unemployed and actively looking for a job
4. Unemployed, wanting a job but not actively looking for a job
5. Permanently sick or disabled
6. Retired
7. In community or military service29
8. Doing housework, looking after children or other persons
9. (other)
   (88 Refusal)
   (99 Don’t know)

29 This code does not apply to JOBS in the military but to compulsory military service only.
- This card shows incomes in annual amounts. Which of the groups on the card represents your household income [your personal/your and your husband’s/wife’s/combined] income from all these sources, AFTER deductions such as income tax? Just tell me the letter beside the row that applies to you.

1. A. Under TL 892 (minimum legal wage level)
2. B. 892–1500
3. C. 1500–3000
4. D. 3000–5000
5. E. 5000–7000
6. F. 7000–8000
7. G. 8000–9000
8. H. 9000–10000
9. I. 10000–11000
10. J. 11000–12000
11. K. 12000–13000
12. L. 13000–14000
13. M. 14000–15000
14. N. 15000–16000
15. O. 16000–19000
16. P. 19000 and over
   (88 Refusal)
   (99 Don’t know)

**QUESTIONS TO BE COMPLETED by INTERVIEWER**

- Did the respondent ask for clarification on any questions?

  1. Never
  2. Almost never
  3. Now and then
  4. Often
  5. Very often
     (99 Don’t know)

- Did you feel that the respondent was reluctant to answer any questions?

  1. Never
  2. Almost never
  3. Now and then
  4. Often
  5. Very often
     (99 Don’t know)
• Did you feel that the respondent tried to answer the questions to the best of his or her ability?
  1. Never
  2. Almost never
  3. Now and then
  4. Often
  5. Very often
     (99 Don’t know)

• Overall, did you feel that the respondent understood the questions?
  1. Never
  2. Almost never
  3. Now and then
  4. Often
  5. Very often
     (99 Don’t know)

• Was anyone else present, who interfered with the interview?
  1. Yes
  2. No

\textit{END OF QUESTIONNAIRE}

• Who was this? Code all that apply.
  1. Husband/wife
  2. Son/daughter (including step, adopted, foster,)
  4. Other relative
  5. Other non-relative
     (99 Don’t know)
This publication has been produced with the assistance of the European Union. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Provincial Administration and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the European Union.